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Abstract—In this paper, the compression of an independent
and identically distributed Gaussian source sequence is studied
in an unsecure network. Within a game theoretic setting for
a three-party noiseless communication network (sender Alice,
legitimate receiver Bob, and eavesdropper Eve), the problem
of how to efficiently compress a Gaussian source with limited
secret key in order to guarantee that Bob can reconstruct with
high fidelity while preventing Eve from estimating an accurate
reconstruction is investigated. It is assumed that Alice and Bob
share a secret key with limited rate. Three scenarios are studied,
in which the eavesdropper ranges from weak to strong in terms
of the causal side information she has. It is shown that one bit of
secret key per source symbol is enough to achieve perfect secrecy
performance in the Gaussian squared error setting, and the
information theoretic region is not optimized by joint Gaussian
random variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work specializes general results in the literature for
secure source compression found in [1], [2] and [3] to the im-
portant case of a Gaussian source and squared-error distortion.
We analytically optimize the information-theoretic secrecy
regions in only certain regimes, but in doing so we draw out
some interesting observations: No more than 1 bit/symbol of
secret key is ever needed for security in the distortion sense;
and jointly-Gaussian selection of variables is sub-optimal.
Since the entropy of a Gaussian random variable is infinite,
it would require an infinite amount of bits to losslessly repre-
sent this variable. Traditional rate distortion theory introduced
by Shannon [4] opens the door for lossy compression, which
characterizes how to effectively compress a source within
certain tolerance for distortion in the setting of point-to-
point communication. Secrecy in an unsecure network with
potential eavesdroppers has been studied in the past. Such
work generally uses equivocation as a metric for secrecy,
which measures how much uncertainty about the source is
reduced given the eavesdropper’s observation. Perfect secrecy
requires almost no reduction in the uncertainty. Equivocation is
an important tool for establishing perfect secrecy in physical
layer security. Wyner [5] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [6] show
how secure transmission can be made possible over a noisy
broadcast channel without using any secret key, and they also
use equivocation as a metric of partial secrecy when perfect
secrecy is not achieved. However, when dealing with source
coding in noiseless channels (a more common assumption in
cryptography), equivocation no longer seems to capture the
essence of the problem because it does not tell us how Eve can
make sense out of her observation in estimating the source. It
is well known, according to Shannon [7], that perfect secrecy
would require the same amount of key bits as information bits.
In particular, for a source with high or infinite entropy, e.g.
a Gaussian source, where perfect secrecy is too expensive to
obtain, how much useful information must be revealed? Can
we leak information to Eve that is less meaningful (e.g. the
high-precision bits)?
While perfect secrecy remains a luxury for secure commu-
nication, Yamamoto [8] takes an alternative approach by mea-
suring the secrecy with distortion given that the eavesdropper
is forced to reconstruct the source. For example, suppose Alice
is a cable television provider and Bob is a customer of Alice
that pays a service fee. Eve is a cable thief who does not
pay Alice and wants to watch the same programs available
to Bob by intercepting the communication. Alice encodes the
programs with some secret key she shares with Bob so that
Bob can decode and watch the programs. Even when the key
is limited, Alice can still choose to encode the important part
(e.g. the video) of the programs. Consequently, the signal Eve
gets may be correlated with the programs but she cannot watch
them even though perfect secrey is compromised. More recent
work by Cuff [1] established a general model for looking at
secrecy as a maxmin problem, in which the payoff function
typically captures two major criteria: reliability (i.e. Bob’s
reconstruction of the source is close enough to the original)
and secrecy (i.e. Eve’s reconstruction of the source is far away
enough from the original). The special case when lossless
compression is required by Bob was studied in [2] in which
the payoff simplifies to distortion between Alice and Eve. The
interesting case in which the distortion measure is hamming
distance and Eve has causal information about the source
realization was solved in [9].
In this paper, we investigate the model proposed in [1]
for an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian
source sequence. Lossy compression between Alice and Bob
is considered. The causal information available to Eve in
estimating the source may differ depending on the application.
When the source sequence needs to be decoded all at once, no
causal information (past moves of Alice and/or Bob) should be
assumed at Eve’s decoder. On the other hand, when the source
is decoded in sequence, it is more appropriate to assume that
Eve gets to see the past moves. The assumption of causal
information disclosure makes this distortion notion of secrecy
a more robust metric and equivocation becomes a special case
of this problem by choosing the distortion function properly
[10], [11]. Different scenarios regarding the causal informa-
tion availability are considered which require solving several
optimization problems. Unlike the lossless case in [2] where it
reduces to a linear programming problem, the constraint region
for lossy compression is much more complicated. Several
schemes are discussed, some of which achieve optimality
under certain conditions. A scalar quantization special case
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is addressed and numerical result is given for all cases.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Let us consider the network in Fig. 1. The sender Al-
ice has an i.i.d. Gaussian source sequence Xn, where each
Xi ∼ N (µ0, σ20), which we denote by p0. Alice compresses
Xn at rate R and sends it to the legitimate receiver Bob
through a noiseless rate-limited channel. In addition to the
channel, Alice and Bob can make use of a shared secret key
K during the communication. An eavesdropper Eve intercepts
the communication and observes the message M ∈ [1 : 2nR],
which will have been at least partially encrypted using K. Both
Bob and Eve are trying to reproduce the source sequence, i.e.
at each time i, Bob estimates the current symbol Xi based on
the encrypted message M and some side information (SI) SBi
while Eve does the same based on her own SI SEi .
Specifically, we have the secret key K ∼ Unif [1 : 2nRs ],
the encoder fn : Xn × K 7→ M, and the decoder for Bob
{gi :M×SBi 7→ Y}ni=1. Similarly, Eve has her decoder {ti :
M×SEi 7→ Z}ni=1. More generally, fn, {gi}ni=1, and {ti}ni=1
are stochastic functions of p(m|xn, k), {p(yi|m, sBi )}ni=1, and
{p(zi|m, sEi )}ni=1, respectively.
Alice
Xn
Bob
Yi
Zi Eve
K
SEi
M
fn gi
ti
SBi = {K,Ci}
Fig. 1: The encoder encodes the whole source sequence Xn with
secret key K. Decoders estimate one symbol at each time instance i.
To measure the fidelity of Bob’s reconstruction and the
secrecy of the source with repect to Eve, we define the
following payoff function:
pi(x, y, z) , 1
σ20
[(z − x)2 − (y − x)2]. (1)
Note that (1) compares the squared error distortions of Bob
and Eve. If the distance between Eve’s symbol z and the
original source symbol x is greater than that of Bob’s symbol y
and x, we have a positive payoff; otherwise, we get a negative
payoff. The payoff function is normalized so that the result
does not depend on the variance of the source. The payoff of
sequences is defined as the average of per letter payoff:
pi(xn, yn, zn) , 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi(xi, yi, zi).
Definition 1. A secrecy rate-payoff triple (R,Rs,Π) is achiev-
able if K ∈ [1 : 2nRs ], M ∈ [1 : 2nR], and
lim
n→∞ sup{fn,{gi}ni=1}
inf
{ti}ni=1
Epi(Xn, Y n, Zn) ≥ Π.
In this paper, we will consider the following three scenarios
of SI and evaluate the corresponding secrecy rate-payoff
regions.
A. Weak Eavesdropper
sEi = {zi−1}
B. Causal Source Awareness
sEi = {xi−1, zi−1}
This corresponds to the scenario in which a stronger eaves-
dropper gets to see the past realization of the source symbols
when estimating the current symbol.
C. Causal General Awareness
sEi = {xi−1, yi−1, zi−1}
Here all causal information is available to Eve for reconstruct-
ing the Gaussian source sequence.
In all three cases, the SI of Bob is given by k and ci =
{xi−1, yi−1, zi−1}. It was shown in [1] that it is sufficient
to consider only sBi = {k} which is independent of Bob’s
awareness of the eavesdropper.
III. SECRECY RATE-PAYOFF REGIONS
Theorem 1. The secrecy rate-payoff triple (R,Rs,Π) for a
weak eavesdropper is achievable for an i.i.d. Gaussian source
if and only if
Rs > 0
and
Π ≤ 1− exp(−2R).
This is an application of [3], in which it is shown that
for lossless compression between Alice and Bob, any strictly
positive key rate will guarantee the maximum average distor-
tion between Alice and Eve. We then apply the distortion-rate
function for Gaussian source d(R) = σ20 exp(−2R) to obtain
this result. Note that because of the way we define the payoff
function in (1), the result does not depend on the mean or the
variance of the source.
Notice that the payoff achieved for any positive Rs is as
good as what would be achieved under perfect secrecy.
With causal source awareness, the general form of the
optimal payoff function was characterized in [1] as
Πp0(R,Rs) = max
p(y,u|x)∈P
min
z(u)
Epi(X,Y, z(U)) (2)
P =
 p(y, u|x) :Rs ≥ I(X;Y |U)R ≥ I(X;U, Y )
 ,
where Πp0(R,Rs) is the maximum Π that is achievable with
rates R and Rs. A proof of this payoff function can be found
in [11]. To specialize this result to the Gaussian case, we
must optimize over the choice of distribution p(y, u|x). It is
often the case for Gaussian problems that the choice of jointly
Gaussian auxiliary random variables is optimal. However,
because Bob and Eve are playing the game competitively
instead of collaboratively, it turns out that a jointly Gaussian
distribution does as poorly as if no auxiliary random variable
is used. Below we analyze the best payoff that can be achieved
with jointly Gaussian distributions and later show that other
non-Gaussian choices of p(y, u|x) can do better.
First, we observe the following from (1) and (2):
Πp0(R,Rs)
= max
p(y,u|x)∈P
min
z(u)
1
σ20
E[(z(U)−X)2 − (Y −X)2]
=
1
σ20
max
p(y,u|x)∈P
[
∑
x,u
p(u|x)p0(x)(x− E[X|U = u])2
−
∑
x,y
p(y|x)p0(x)(y − x)2] (3)
where (3) comes from the fact that the conditional mean is
the minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimator. Here we
are using
∑
and
∫
interchangebly for convenience because it
is not clear whether Y and U are discrete or not at this stage.
A. Jointly Gaussian
Theorem 2. The solution to (2) for a Gaussian source
distribution p0 is
Πp0(R,Rs) = 1− exp(−2 min(Rs, R))
when p(x, y, u) is constrained to be a jointly Gaussian distri-
bution.
Proof: Achieving this payoff is easy. We only need to
choose p(y|x) such that X and Y are jointly Gaussian and
I(X;Y ) ≤ min(Rs, R). We then choose U to be Gaussian
and independent of X and Y .
To show the converse, we first fix p(x, y, u) to be jointly
Gaussian and write (2) and (3) in terms of the correlations ρxy ,
ρxu, and ρyu. It can be verified that maximizing the objective
funtion in (2) is equivalent to maximizing g(ρxy, ρxu, ρyu) ,
ρ2xy − ρ2xu. Ignoring the constraints on valid choice of ρxy ,
ρxu, ρyu that are implied by any covariance matrix, we have
two constraints from (2):
Rs ≥ 1
2
log
(1− ρ2xu)(1− ρ2yu)
1− ρ2xy − ρ2xu − ρ2yu + 2ρxyρxuρyu
(4)
R ≥ 1
2
log
(1− ρ2yu)
1− ρ2xy − ρ2xu − ρ2yu + 2ρxyρxuρyu
. (5)
By removing constraint (5), with some algebraic manipulation,
it can be shown that g(ρxy, ρxu, ρyu) ≤ 1 − exp(−2R0).
Similarly, by removing constriant (4), it can be shown that
g(ρxy, ρxu, ρyu) ≤ 1− exp(−2R). Hence, the objective func-
tion under all constraints needs to satisfy g(ρxy, ρxu, ρyu) ≤
1− exp(−2 min(Rs, R)).
Theorem 2 implies that for a jointly Gaussian distribution
p(x, y, u), choosing the auxiliary random variable U correlated
with X and Y does not improve the payoff from an uncor-
related U . In this case, U does not give out any information
about X and therefore the distortion between Alice and Eve is
kept to a maximum as if under perfect secrecy. However, the
rate-distortion tradeoff between Alice and Bob is limited by
the secret key rate. Is it possible to achieve a higher payoff by
another choice of p(y, u|x)? Below we show how a simple
Gaussian quantization can provide a better solution that is
independent of the key rate Rs under certain conditions.
B. Gaussian Quantization
Let us consider the following construction. We first fix
X ∼ p0. X is quantized symmetrically about its mean with
uniform intervals T as shown in Fig. 2 so that Y , nT, n ,
arg mink∈Z |kT − X|, and U = |Y |. With this construction,
Y is a function of X and U is a function of Y . We denote
the Markov relationship by X− −Y− −U . The reason for
choosing such a symmetric quantization is that, to maintain
a high distortion between Alice and Eve in (3), we want to
keep E[X|U = u] unbiased for all u.
Then the two constraints in (2) become
Rs ≥ I(X;Y |U) = H(Y |U) = s bits, s < 1 (6)
R ≥ I(X;U, Y ) = H(Y ). (7)
T
T 2T 2T  T 3T 3T ......
......
Y 0T
Fig. 2: Symmetric quantization of the Gaussian random variable X
with uniform interval T .
Here we apply the operational meaning of differential
entropy from Theorem 9.3.1 of [12] to get
H(Y ) + log T → h(X), as T → 0,
where h(X) denotes the differential entropy of X . Recall
that the differential entropy of a Gaussian random variable is
h(X) = 12 log(2pieσ
2
0). Therefore, for Rs ≥ 1 bit, as T → 0,
a sufficient condition for (7) is T ≥ √2pieσ0 exp(−R). The
distortion between Alice and Eve under this Gaussian quanti-
zation scheme can be asymptotically calculated as follows:
D∆(R) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
y
p(y|x) 1√
2piσ0
e
− x2
2σ20 (y − x)2dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ0
e
− x2
2σ20 (nT − x)2dx
≤ pie
2
σ20 exp(−2R)
Summarizing the above analysis, we have
Πp0(R,Rs) ≥ 1−
pie
2
2−2R for Rs ≥ 1 bit and R→∞.
With Gaussian quantization, even though we sacrifice a con-
stant factor on the distortion between Alice and Bob, the
overall payoff is no longer governed by the key rate Rs given
that Rs ≥ 1 bit. This illustrates that the jointly Gaussian
distribution does not achieve optimal payoff. In Section V,
another choice of U with the same quantizer will be discussed
for arbitary R and Rs that can perform better than jointly
Gaussian for low key rate Rs. Next, we will provide a
construction for Y and U that achieves maximum payoff under
certain conditions.
C. Optimal Payoff for Rs ≥ 1 bit
Theorem 3. If the key rate Rs ≥ 1 bit, the optimal secrecy
rate-payoff function for an i.i.d. Gaussian source and causal
source awareness is given by
Πp0(R,Rs) = 1− 2−2R.
Proof: To see the converse, observe that by relaxing the
constraints in (2) and evaluating (3), we have
max
p(y,u|x)
∑
u,x
p(u|x)p0(x)(x− E[X|U = u])2 = σ20 (8)
min
p(y,u|x):I(X;Y )≤R
∑
x,y
p(y|x)p0(x)(y − x)2 = σ202−2R (9)
where (9) comes from the distortion rate function d(R)
of Gaussian source. To show the achievability, we choose
p(y, u|x) as follows. Y is chosen such that X and Y are zero-
mean jointly Gaussian. U , |Y | and V , sgn(Y ), where
sgn(Y ) is a binary variable indicating the sign of Y . Observe
that U, V together gives Y . By this construction, we have
I(X;Y, U) = I(X;Y )
I(X;Y |U) = I(X;V |U) < 1 bit. (10)
Therefore, given that Rs ≥ 1 bit, the constraint Rs ≥
I(X;Y |U) is automatically satisfied from (10). In addition,
E[X|U = u] = 12E[X|Y = u] + 12E[X|Y = −u] = 0 for all
u due to symmetry. The payoff achieves 1− 2−2R.
The optimization problem (2) for the case Rs < 1 bit
involves the coupling of two terms in (3). In the next section,
we present a special case for this regime using a Gaussian
quantizer.
For the causal general awareness where a strong eavesdrop-
per has the causal information from all parties (Alice, Bob
and Eve), the secrecy rate-payoff region was studied in [1]
and the result under a general payoff function and i.i.d. source
distribution was given in Theorem 4.1 of [1] as the following:
Π(R,Rs) = max
p(y,u,v|x)∈P
min
z(u)
Epi(X,Y, z(U)) (11)
P =

p(y, u, v|x) :
p(y|u, v, x) = p(y|u, v)
Rs ≥ I(X,Y ;V |U)
R ≥ I(X;U, V )
 .
It turns out that Theorem 3 also holds for the causal
general awareness case. Because of the Markov relation
X− −(U, V )− −Y , we have R ≥ I(X;U, V ) ≥ I(X;Y ),
which gives us the same result as in Theorem 3. With the same
choice of Y , U , and V , I(X,Y ;V |U) = 1 bit constantly.
Concluding this section, we have shown that Rs = 1 bit is
the maximum key rate needed even in the case of a strong
eavesdropper who is aware of the past moves of all parties.
IV. GAUSSIAN QUANTIZER SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we will address a special structure of the
system for the case of causal source awareness. A symbol-
by-symbol quantization of the source sequence is performed
before the transmission and the legitimate receiver Bob in this
system happens to reproduce the scalar quantization of the
source at the decoder. That is, we are restricting to a subset
Bn of all valid encoder and decoder pairs (fn, {gi}ni=1).
Let Xˆi ∼ pˆ0 be the conditional mean of a uni-
form quantization of Xi as in Section III-B, i.e. Xˆi =
E[Xi|Quantization bin of Xi], and Mˆ be the encoded message
to be transmitted. Let the optimal payoff function under such
restriction be Π∆p0(R,Rs). The following lemma indicates
that revealing the causal realization of the original source is
equivalent to revealing the causal realization of the quantized
version of the source in Eve’s estimate.
Lemma 1. Xi− −(Mˆ, Xˆi−1)− −Xi−1 for all i = 1, ..., n.
This can be verified by observing that Xi− −Xˆi− −Mˆ .
Therefore, we can alternatively analyze the performance of
the system in Fig. 3. This model is defined formally as the
following.
Definition 2. The rate-distortion triple (R,Rs, D) is achiev-
able if
P[Yˆ n 6= Xˆn]→ 0 as n→∞, and
lim
n→∞ sup{fˆn,{gˆi}ni=1}
inf
{tˆi(mˆ,sˆEi )}ni=1
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Zˆi − Xˆi)2
]
≥ D.
Lemma 2. Xi− −Xˆi− −(Mˆ, Xˆi−1) for all i = 1, ..., n.
Now by applying Theorem 4.1 from [2], we have
that (R,Rs, D) is achievable iff D ≤ Dpˆ0(R,Rs) ,
maxp(uˆ|xˆ)∈Qminzˆ(uˆ) E[(zˆ(Uˆ) − Xˆ)2], where Xˆ ∼ pˆ0 and
Q = {p(uˆ|xˆ) : R ≥ H(Xˆ), Rs ≥ H(Xˆ|Uˆ)}. If we
fix (R,Rs) and suppose p(uˆ|xˆ) ∈ Q is the corresponding
distribution that achieves Dpˆ0(R,Rs), Tn , {ti(mˆ, sEi )}ni=1,
Tˆn , {tˆi(mˆ, sˆEi )}ni=1, then we have the following inequalities:
σ20Π
∆
p0(R,Rs)
(a)
= lim
n→∞ supBn
inf
Tn
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Zi −Xi)2]− E[(Xi − Yˆi)2]
(b)
= lim
n→∞ supBn
inf
Tˆn
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Zˆi −Xi)2]− E[(Xi − Yˆi)2]
(c)
= lim
n→∞ supBn
inf
Tˆn
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Zˆi − Xˆi)2] + E[(Xˆi −Xi)2]
+2E
[
E[(Zˆi − Xˆi)(Xˆi −Xi)|Xˆi]
]
− E[(Xi − Yˆi)2]
(d)
= lim
n→∞ supBn
inf
Tˆn
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Zˆi − Xˆi)2]
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[(Xˆi −Xi)2]− E[(Xi − Yˆi)2]
(e)
= Dpˆ0(R,Rs) (12)
Here, (a) follows by definition of Π∆(R,Rs); (b) follows
from Lemma 1; (c) follows from law of total expectation; (d)
follows from Lemma 2 since Zˆi is a function of (Mˆ, Xˆi−1);
and (e) follows by Definition 2. Summarizing the analysis in
this section, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Π∆p0(R,Rs) =
1
σ20
Dpˆ0(R,Rs).
Dpˆ0(R,Rs) can be calculated as a linear program (LP). The
technical details of this LP can be found in [2].
Alice
Xn
Bob
Eve
K SBi
fn
Quantizer Source 
Encoder 
Xˆn fˆn
SˆEi
gˆi
tˆi
Mˆ Yˆi
Zˆi
Fig. 3: An alternative model in which quantization is performed
before lossless compression.
V. NUMERICAL COMPUTATION RESULT
In this section, we numerically compare the payoffs under
different schemes for the scenario of causal source awareness.
Since the optimization for the causal general awareness case
involves two auxiliary random variables and displays more
complexity, we numerically analyze only the causal source
awareness case as an example.
We compare the Gaussian quantization scheme with the
jointly Gaussian scheme. Even though in Section III-B, we
gave only an analytical lower bound on the payoff as a function
of the rates as R→∞, here we propose a numerical scheme
that can evaluate the achievable secrecy rate-payoff for arbitary
R and Rs. The choice of the random variable Y is the same
as in Section III-B and U , n mod N , where N is some
positive integer. Intuitively, U is a coarser quantizer of X . Here
we greedily obtain an achievable lower bound by sequentially
solving for the optimal T that satisfies R ≥ I(X;U, Y ) and
the optimal N that satisfies Rs ≥ I(X;Y |U). The payoff of
the optimal scheme for Rs ≥ 1 bit is also computed for low
Rs for comparison. These results are shown in Fig. 4, which
shows that the Gaussian quantization choice outperforms the
jointly Gaussian choice in the payoff as a function of Rs
for a fixed R. The quantization upper bound is numerically
obtained by solving the LP. Note that even though Theorem
4 gives a tight bound, the implementation of LP requires that
the eavesdropper’s reconstruction fall in the same quantization
alphabet.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have applied the secrecy source coding problem in-
troduced in [1] for the important case of Gaussian sources.
The payoff function has been defined in a way such that
the reconstruction qualities (measured by mean squared error)
of the source from Bob and from Eve are compared. Three
scenarios depending on the SI to Eve (from weak to strong)
have been investigated. Our results show 1) for a weak Eve
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1
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ff 
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R=
2.
7 
bit
s, 
R S
 )
 
 
Jointly Gaussian
Quantization Achievable
Quantization Upper Bound
Optimal Scheme for Rs* 1 bit
Fig. 4: Payoff as a function of key rate Rs for fixed R = 2.7 bits
who has no causal information about the source, maximum
distortion between Alice and Eve can be achieved with no
loss of quality in the communication between Alice and Bob
with any positive key rate; and 2) for an Eve that has causal
information of Alice (and Bob), at most 1 bit of secret key is
needed for each Gaussian source symbol to force maximum
distortion to Eve while keeping the rate-distortion tradeoff
at the same level as in point-to-point communication. This
implies that even if a very high rate is demanded by Bob
to have a good quality reconstruction of the source, no more
secret key is needed, because the “higher precision” bits do not
leak out any information helpful to Eve. When the key rate is
less than 1 bit (and Rs < R), the optimization problem cannot
be decoupled and the constraint region is rather complicated.
Counter-intuitively, choosing the auxiliary random variable to
be jointly Gaussian is not optimal. This problem is still left
open from this work. However, the example given in the
numerical results section indicates there will be a tradeoff
between secrecy and reliability.
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